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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
and may be shown by parol. Under an identical statute in California,' it
was held that unless the lease specifically limits the use, or raises a restric-
tion necessarily implied from the language employed, it is not forfeited by
a different use, even if illegal. '
The decision is specific: The Montana Supreme Court will not raise
an implied covenant restricting the use of leased property to the use con-
templated by the parties. The court may well have regarded the general
prohibition against waste as a sufficient safeguard of the lessor's in-
terest, but it is arguable that it is an inadequate safeguard in the
hght of the present decision.' At any rate it is clear that the apparent
harshness of the present decision arises from the majority's position that
the use of a food store building for the purpose of a garage, in and of itself,
is not a substantial injury to the inheritance and therefore waste. Whether
or not this is so, it seems, is a question to be resolved according to the facts
of each case.
The instant case gives warning to lawyers, in their capacity as drafters
of lease agreements, to deal explicitly with possibilities of use, and not to
rely on reasonable implications which arise from the circumstances of the
agreement.
WILLIAM CONKLIN
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - AssERTION op CLAIMS - TIME LIMITA-
TION-Claimant was involved in an accident during an oil drilling opera-
tion of his employer, but suffered no apparent present harm. A rib injury
was discovered approximately one year later. Within 120 days thereafter
he brought action under the Kansas workmen's compensation statute, which
required written claim "within one hundred twenty days after the acci-
dent." Claimant recovered judgment in the district court allowing com-
pensation. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kansas, held, reversed.
Where the statute requires claim to be filed within 120 days from the date
of accident, it is irrelevant that the resulting. injury was not discovered
until that time had elapsed. Rutledge v. Sandlin, 310 P.2d 950 (Kan.
1957).
The workmen's compensation laws of all states but two provide for
time limitations on filing claims for compensation.' The statutes of a
majority of the states include provisions that no claim for compensation
will be allowed unless filed within a certain period of time after the in-
jury." The courts of those states whose limitation statutes use the word
"CAL. CIV. CODE, § 1930 (Deering 1949).
"Keating v. Preston, 42 Cal. App. 2d 110, 108 P.2d 479 (1950).
'5The instant case points up a dilemma which may arise by reason of the holding.
Alterations are permitted by the lease if deemed desirable for the lessee's use.
Under the rule announced by the court there is no restriction regarding the use of
the premises. Since any use of the building is allowed, any alterations consistent
with that use would also be allowed. Under such a construction as this the lessor
must have granted much more than he intended.
'See Landauer v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 175 Ore. 418, 154 P.2d 189,
197 (1944) (dictum).
21d., 154 P.2d at 201.
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injury have generally held that the statutory period begins to run from the
time the injury becomes apparent and compensable.'
In Baldwin v. Scullion,' a Wyoming case decided in 1936 under a
limitation statute using the word injury, the court indicates the reasoning
used to support the majority view. Citing decisions of the United States
District Court for Maryland, and the supreme courts of Texas, Missouri,
Arizona, California, Maine, Washington and Connecticut, and also Corpus
Juris,' the court emphasized that the provisions of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts should receive a liberal construction in order to accomplish
the benevolent purpose for which they were promulgated. The court said
that the employee should not be denied compensation merely because sci-
ence could not recognize conditions produced at the time of the accident
which have gradually and ultimately produced a compensable injury. This
is in keeping with the underlying policy of workmen's compensation laws
"that industry (and ultimately the consumer) should bear its fair share
of the cost of injuries to workers without trying to place the blame on either
party. '
The limitation statutes of a minority of the states provide that no claim
will be allowed unless filed within a designated period after the accident.!
With the exception of Nebraska,8 the courts of those jurisdictions having
limitation statutes using the word accident, and which have passed on the
matter, have held that the period commences to run from the date the ac-
cident occurred, and not from the date that the injury becomes apparent.
This is the position of the instant case.
This approach appears to be based on judicial acceptance of the lay-
man's definition of the word accident and a belief that the term is not open
'to interpretation. That the two terms are not interchangeable is well illus-
trated by the Idaho legislature's substituting the word accident for the
word injury.' The Idaho court construing the statute said:
If the legislature had intended that the commencement of the
limitation period, within which claims could be made on employers,
should continue to be from the date of the first manifestation of a
compensable injury, and not from the date of the accident, it
would not have made the substitution. We have no doubt that
when the legislature substituted the word "accident" for the word
"injury" it intended to change the date from which the time for
making a claim should commence to run, and, to change that date
from the first manifestation of a compensable injury to the date
of the accident.
'Michna v. Collins Co., 116 Conn. 193, 164 Atl. 502 (1933) ; Griffin v. Rustless Iron
& Steel Co., 187 Md. 524, 51 A.2d 280 (1947). See also 58 AM. Jur., WorA'men'8
Compensation § 409 (1942).
450 Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531, 108 A.L.R. 304 (1936).
671 C.J., Workmen'8 Compensation Act8 § 734 (1935).
'HoROVITZ, CURRENT TRENDS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 479 (1947).
'Landauer v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 175 Ore. 418, 154 P.2d 189, 197
(1944) (dictum).
'Keenan v. Consumers Public Power District, 152 Neb. 54, 40 N.W.2d 261 (1949).
'Landauer v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 175 Ore. 418, 154 P.2d 189, 197
(1944) (dictum) ; Ann., 108 A.L.R. 316 (1936).
"Moody v. State Highway Department, 56 Idaho 21, 48 P.2d 1108, 1110 (1935).
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The Montana limitation statutes use the word accident. Section 92-601,
Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, provides that a claim must be presented
"within twelve months from the date of the happening of the accident."
Section 92-807 provides that notice must be served upon the employer or
insurer "within thirty days after the occurrence of the accident." The
phraseology of Montana's limitation statutes would appear to compel the
result of the instant case even more certainly than the Kansas statute, be-
cause it refers specifically to the "occurrence" and the "happening" of
the accident.
The passing years have reflected an increasingly liberal tendency in
judicial construction of workmen's compensation statutes." An examina-
tion of the Montana decisions reveals that this state has followed the liberal
trend.' The question which thus arises is whether, through a liberal inter-
"In some states, including Montana, liberal construction is expressly required by
statute. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 92-1838. Even so, this principle was
not always adhered to in the early days of workmen's compensation litigation.
HOROVITZ, CURRENT TRENDS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 472 (1947). A prime
example of this tendency toward narrow interpretation is found in an early Michi-
gan case, Cooke v. Holland Furnace Co., 200 Mich. 192, 106 N.W. 1013 (1918). The
Michigan limitation statute contained the word injury. In this case, where a head
injury did not become apparent until approximately a year after a metal bolt had
struck the head of the workman, who thereafter did not file a claim, for compensa-
tion within the statutory period from the date of the accident, compensation was
disallowed on the ground that by using the word injury the legislature intended
the period of limitation to begin at the time of the occurence which gave rise to the
injury. The court relied upon cases involving common law or statutory actions for
negligence where the statute of limitations commences to run from the happening
of the negligent act. It said, "Our duty is not to enact, but to expound, the law;
not to legislate but to construe legislation, to apply the law as we find it, and to
maintain its integrity as it has been written by a co-ordinate branch of the state
government. If the law as written works hardships in a special class of cases, the
remedy lies with the branch of government charged with the duty of enacting law."
It is significant that counsel for the claimant made a statement which today has
become accepted. He said, "There must necessarily be a new definition of the
word injury to embrace the circumstances that arise under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law."
'As was the tendency in most states, early Montana decisions manifested little
liberality in construing the workmen's compensation statutes. In Chmielewska v.
Butte & Superior Mining Co., 81 Mont. 36, 261 Pac. 616 (1927), compensation was
refused when the widow of a worker killed in an industrial accident lived in Po-
land, and the processing of necessary claim documents through international chan-
nels required a longer time than the six-month statutory period. In 1934, in Clark
v. Olson, 96 Mont. 417, 31 P.2d 283 (1934), the Montana court, citing Cooke v. Hol-
land Furnace Co., supra note 11, reiterated the policy of strict construction for the
preservation of the integrity of the law.
However, later decisions indicated that the court had begun to follow the gen-
eral trend toward liberality. In Chisholm v. Vocational School for Girls, 103 Mont.
.503, 64 P.2d 838 (1936), where a workman filed a faulty claim within the statu-
tory period and the claim was refiled with the defect corrected after the expiration
of the statutory period, compensation was allowed. It was there said, "The Indus-
trial Accident Board . .. Is a poorman's court or rusticum forum, wherein, a claim-
ant may present his cause without the assistance of counsel and, therefore, the
strict rules of pleading and practice should not be applied."
More recently the Montana court again refrained from a strict technical con-
struction of the act. In Gugler v. Industrial Accident Board, 117 Mont. 38. 157
P.2d 89 (1945), the claimant was struck In the eye by a piece of metal In 1936 but
did not become aware of a deficiency In eyesight until 1940. when he filed his claim.
Compensation was allowed on the ground that, since the claimant's doctor notified
the Industrial Accident Board of the accident and filed his own claim for reim-
bursement for his services In treating the claimant, the requirement for filing a
claim within the statutory period was satisfied. It was re-emphasized that there Is
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pretation, the Montana court could be expected to reach a result contrary
to that of the present case.
Perhaps a contrary result is conceivable,' but it would appear much
more likely that the Montana court would follow the instant case. This is
because the Kansas court which rendered that decision itself adheres to the
modern liberal trend," and because every limitation statute using the word
accident which has been construed, with the exception of Nebraska's, has
been held to require that the period of limitation begins to run from the
happening of the accident. Thus it would seem that although the acts are
to be liberally construed, when a court is confronted with the word accident
there is no room for construction and that holding accident to mean mani-
festation of injury would be unwarranted judicial legislation."
That courts generally construe limitation statutes using injury to refer,
to manifestation of injury furnishes no authority for a statute which reads
accident, since injury refers to effect while accident refers to occurrence.
The issue here involved has not yet been litigated in Montana,' but the
probability of a result like that in the instant case should be avoided by leg-
islative action, substituting the word injury or discovery of injury for the
word accident in Montana's limitation statute. No workman should be
denied relief merely because the injury he receives is not discoverable at
the outset, if it later appears and causes a disability the act was intended
to make compensable.
JOHN P. ACHER.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - EFFECT OF POST-INJURY WAGES ON
ELIGIBILITY FOR PAYMENTS -PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION
WHILE INELIGIBLE TO DRAW PAYMENTS--In December, 1948, claimant suf-
fered an industrial accident. After filing a timely claim for compensation,
be continued working at full pay until July, 1952. In October, 1953, the
Montana Industrial Accident Board heard and denied the claim but was re-
a need for liberal construction in order to effectuate the humane purpose of the
legislation.
In Yurkovich v. Industrial Accident Board, 314 P.2d 866 (Mont. 1957), an em-
ployee was injured and requested from the Industrial Accident Board information
on procedure to be followed in obtaining compensation. The Board failed to In-
form him of the necessity of filing a claim under oath. The workman did not file
a claim until later when he became aware of this requirement, after the statutory
period had expired. The court allowed compensation, stating that the Industrial Ac-
cident Board stands in a fiduciary relationship to the injured workmen, and will
not be heard to assert the running of the time limitation when Its own inaction
caused the claim to be filed too late.
"Keenan v. Consumers Public Power District, 152 Neb. 54, 40 N.W.2d 261 (1949).
"In fact, in 1944 the words "injury arising by accident" were construed by that court
to include injury sustained in the performance of usual tasks performed In the
usual manner even though there be no event In the nature of an outside or Interven-
ing cause. Murphy v. I.C.U. Const. Co., 158 Kan. 541, 148 P.2d 771 (1944). With
this compare Murphy v. Anaconda Company, 321 P.2d 1094 (Mont 1958).
"See the language of the Idaho Supreme Court In Moody v. State Highway Depart-.
ment, 56 Idaho 21, 48 P.2d 1008, 1110 (1935), set out In the text at note 10 supra.
"But note the reference in Gaffney v. Industrial Accident Board, 324 P.2d 1063. 1064
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